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INTRODUCTION
In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,' the Supreme Court held
that a Richmond, Virginia ordinance setting aside thirty per-
cent of city subcontracts for minority-owned firms violated the
equal protection clause' of the Constitution. The Court held
that equal protection had been denied because racial classifica-
tions had been used without evidence of past discrimination
against those who would benefit, because race-neutral alterna-
tives had not been considered, and because the remedy had
not been narrowly tailored to minimize adverse affects on
other groups.3
The standards articulated by the Court in Croson require a
more stringent level of analysis for race- or gender-based state
and local purchasing preference programs than had been ap-
plied to similar federal government programs,4 but they do not
forbid the use of those classifications by states and cities. The
standards do, however, place a substantial evidentiary burden
on the use of race or gender classifications.
Minnesota's purchasing preference statute set aside a por-
tion of the state's purchasing budget for acquisitions from
small businesses and allowed the grant of a 5% pricing prefer-
ence in competitive bidding. 6 Firms owned by racial minorities
and females were among those eligible for the program. 7 Suit
was brought in Minnesota District Court challenging the stat-
1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
2. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment, the equal protection clause, states,
in part: "No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509-11.
4. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding congressional au-
thority to use racial classifications under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment).
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment states: "The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
5. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504. Justice O'Connor wrote: "While the States and their
subdivisions may take remedial action when they possess evidence that their own
spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination, they must iden-
tify that discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before they may use
race-conscious relief." Id. The city of Richmond failed to meet this burden of proof
and thus did not have a compelling interest to apportion public contracts on the basis
of race. Id.
6. MINN. STAT. § 16B.19, subd. 1 (1988).
7. See id. § 645.445, subd. 5, repealed by Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 541, § 31, 1990
Minn. Laws 1476; see also id. § 645.445, subd. 5 (amending the 1980 definition to
include specific references to racial minorities and women).
[Vol. 17
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ute.8 The state agreed to suspend the programs pending new
legislative action.9 The Minnesota Legislature adopted a tem-
porary race- and gender-neutral program to assist "economi-
cally disadvantaged" businesses and directed that a study be
conducted to determine if there was evidence of discrimination
against women- and minority-owned firms under the standards
of the Croson decision.10 The Minnesota study, entitled A
Study of Discrimination Against Women- or Minority-Owned
Businesses and Other Small Business Topics (Study), was
presented to the Legislature in January 1990. It found evi-
dence of discrimination against women- and minority-owned
businesses in its analysis of state purchasing, in the survey data
collected, and in oral testimony presented to a special Legisla-
tive Commission."1
The conclusions of the Study are not surprising. During the
1970s numerous articles were written regarding the struggle of
minority businesses in Minnesota. 2 In 1975, a white, male-
dominated legislature included business owners who were so-
cially or economically disadvantaged in a program qualifying
the disadvantaged for set-asides or preferences in purchasing
by state government.' 3  The programs were reviewed and
amended by the Legislature four times between 1975 and
1988, and annual reports on their implementation were re-
quired by the implementing agencies.
14
8. Sorenson Bros., Inc. v. Levine, No. CX-89-3463 (2d D. Minn. April 14, 1989)
(Plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent denial of a road construction bid based
solely on fact that bid did not allocate 5% of subcontracts to disadvantaged business
enterprises.).
9. Id.; see Stipulation and Order for Dismissal, Sorenson Bros., Inc., No. CX-89-
3463.
10. Small Business Procurements Commission, ch. 352, § 1, 1989 Minn. Laws
3169.
11. See MINNESOTA DEP'T. OF ADMIN., MGMT. ANALYSIS Div., A STUDY OF DIScRIM-
INATION AGAINST WOMEN- AND MINORrIY-OWNED BUSINESSES AND OF OTHER SMALL
BUSINESS Topics (January 1990) [hereinafter STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION]; REPORT TO
THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON SMALL BUSINESS PROCUREMENTS, A FOOT IN THE
DOOR: ENSURING FAIR MARKET ACCESS FOR FEMALE- AND MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS
(January 1990) [hereinafter A FOOT IN THE DOOR].
12. See, e.g., E. ScoTr, THE GROWTH OF MINORITY BUSINESSES IN THE TWIN CITIES
METROPOLITAN AREA (1977); J. BROWN, METROPOLITAN MINORITY BUSINESS SURVEY: A
STUDY OF THE TWIN CITY MINORITY BUSINESS ACTIVITY AND PROBLEMS (1974); D.
WICKSTROM & J. HOLDRIDGE, BLACK BUSINESS IN MINNEAPOLIS AND SAINT PAUL, A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF BLACK AND WHITE OWNED BUSINESSES (1971).
13. See MINN. STAT. §§ 16.082, subd. 5, 16.083, subd. 1 (Supp. 1975).
14. MINN. STAT. § 321 (1977) (establishing a program for the Department of
Transportation); MINN. STAT. § 137.31 (1979) (establishing a program for the Uni-
1991]
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What is surprising is that the standard enunciated by the
Supreme Court will require a large expenditure of public time
and money to conclude, as the Kerner Commission did in
1968,15 and as numerous other studies have since, 16 that racial
minorities and females experience a disadvantage in a tradi-
tionally white, male-dominated society. The standard, adopted
under the rubric of equal protection, will stand as a substantial
barrier to fulfilling the goal of the fourteenth amendment by
discouraging state and local jurisdictions from reaching be-
yond their self interest to assist groups without dominant polit-
ical power in the community.'
7
This article will first examine the Croson decision and the de-
bate over its meaning. Next, it will discuss the application of
the Court's evidentiary standards in the Minnesota study. Fi-
nally, this article will discuss possible alternative formulations
of standards under the equal protection clause.
versity of Minnesota); MINN. STAT. § 645.445 (1980) (amending the definition of so-
cially and economically disadvantaged); MINN. STAT. § 645.445 (1988) (adding
business owners residing or employed in counties where married couples had a me-
dian income 70% or less than the state-wide median income for married couples);
MINN. STAT. § 473.142 (1988) (establishing a program for the Metropolitan Council
and agencies).
15. U.S. RIOT COMMISSION REPORT, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).
Segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a destructive envi-
ronment totally unknown to most white Americans. What white Americans
have never fully understood-but what the Negro can never forget-is that
white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created
it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.
Id. at 2.
16. See, e.g., Bates, Impact of Preferential Policies on Minority-owned Businesses, 14 REV.
BLACK POL. ECON. 51 (Summer 1985); Fratoe, Social Capital of Black Business Owners, 16
REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 33 (Spring 1988); Mescon, The Entrepreneurial Institute: Educa-
tion and Training for Minority Small Business Owners, 25J. SMALL Bus. MGMT. (Jan. 1987).
17. The impact on minority community members is already being felt. Although
the numbers are not available for Minnesota, in Richmond, Virginia, minority-firm
participation in state contracts fell from 32% to 11% after cessation of the set-aside
program. In Illinois, minority participation in state contracts declined 50%. See Rei-
dinger, Life After Croson, 76 A.B.A. J. 33 (Oct. 1990); Pear, Courts are Undoing Efforts to
Aid Minority Contractors, N. Y. Times,July 16, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (To avoid suits, large
agencies such as the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, have voluntarily
suspended their programs.).
Although many studies are underway, other jurisdictions are reluctant to under-
take them for a variety of reasons. For example, in Rhode Island, a proposal to con-
duct a study has been tabled, in part, because of state budget problems. Interview
with Charles Newton, Coordinator for Minority Business Affairs for Rhode Island, in
Providence, R.I. (Aug. 1990).
[Vol. 17
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I. THE STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD
In Croson, the United States Supreme Court found that a
race-based set-aside program for minority contractors adopted
to increase the participation of nonwhite owned firms in the
contracts awarded by the city of Richmond violated the re-
quirements of the equal protection clause of the Constitu-
tion. "' The Court was concerned because the Richmond City
Council had no evidence of prior discrimination against these
businesses. In addition to this lack of evidence of discrimina-
tion, the Court found that race-neutral alternatives had not
been considered and found to be inadequate, and that the
remedy adopted by the city had not been narrowly tailored to
minimize any adverse affects on other groups. 19
Richmond's Minority Business Utilization Plan (Plan) re-
quired prime contractors for city contracts to subcontract at
least 30% of the dollar amount of their contracts to one or
more minority business enterprises (MBEs).2O An MBE was
defined as a business which is at least 51% owned and con-
trolled by black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo or
Aleut citizens of the United States. The firms did not have to
be located in the Richmond area to qualify. 2'
The Plan had been adopted in April 1983, after a public
hearing,2 2 and was to expire on June 30, 1988. A study was
presented which showed that, while the general population of
Richmond was 50% black, only .67% of the city's prime con-
struction contracts had been awarded to minority businesses
from 1978 to 1983. It was also established that a majority of
the local contractors' associations had virtually no minority
membership. Opponents questioned whether there were
enough minority-owned firms in the area to satisfy the 30%
set-aside requirement.
2 3
As adopted, the Plan was declared to be "remedial" in na-
18. Croson, 488 U.S. at 511.
19. Id. at 507-10.
20. Id. at 477-79. The set-aside did not apply to city contracts awarded to minor-
ity-owned prime contractors. Id.
21. Id. at 478-79. An otherwise qualified MBE from anywhere in the United
States could avail itself of the 30% set-aside.
22. Evidence developed during the adoption process included the testimony of
seven members of the public. Two were in favor of the ordinance and five were
opposed. Id. at 479.
23. Id. at 480-81.
1991]
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ture and enacted for the purpose of "promoting wider partici-
pation by minority business enterprises in the construction of
public projects. ' 24 The Director of the Department of General
Services was authorized to grant waivers in limited circum-
stances, where there was a showing that sufficient, relevant mi-
nority firms were unavailable or unwilling to participate in the
project.25
After adoption of the ordinance, the J.A. Croson Company
became the only bidder on a plumbing project for the city jail.
One minority vendor sought to participate as a subcontractor,
but was unable to submit a quote within the time limit because
his supplier required a lengthy credit check. The minority ven-
dor submitted a late quote to Croson which was higher than a
nonminority supplier. Croson sought a waiver from the city
regarding the set-aside requirement or, alternatively, for the
opportunity to increase the price due to the higher bid from
the minority vendor. The city rejected both requests and
elected to re-bid the project. Croson began legal proceedings
in Federal District Court.2 6
Efforts designed to assist women-owned businesses have
also been rejected by the Court on equal protection grounds.
While the Court has, in the past, applied a less rigorous stan-
dard of review to gender-based classifications,27 in Michigan
Road Builders Association, Inc. v. Milliken,2 s it affirmed a lower
court decision holding that a Michigan plan designed to bene-
fit women-owned businesses violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Michigan program
to benefit women-owned businesses was not "substantially re-
lated to an important government function.
29
24. Id. at 479.
25. Id. "To this end, the Director promulgated Contract Clauses, Minority Busi-
ness Utilization Plan (Contract Clauses)." Id. at 478.
26. Id. at 716. Croson argued that the Richmond ordinance was unconstitutional
on its face and as applied in this case. Id.
27. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). In applying
the strict scrutiny test, the Court stated that the test must be "applied free of fixed
notions concerning the rules and abilities of males and females." Id. at 724-25. The
Court further held that if the statutory objective is to protect members of a class
because they are presumed to be traditionally handicapped, then the objective itself
is illegitimate. Id. at 725.
28. 834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987).
29. Id. Because the Court concluded that Michigan lacked a "compelling" inter-
est to support the racial and ethnic distinctions and an "important" interest to sup-
port the gender-based distinctions, the Court did not address whether the means
[Vol. 17
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In 1981, the Michigan Road Builders Association chal-
lenged, on equal protection grounds, a 1980 Michigan statute
which set aside a portion of state contracts for women- and
minority-owned businesses.3 0  The Michigan statute set aside
not less than 7% of state contracts for minority-owned busi-
nesses and not less than 5% for women-owned businesses.3 '
In reviewing this statute, the appeals court applied a less strin-
gent standard of review to the program, but concluded:
Even under this less stringent standard of review, the WBE
[woman owned businesses] preferences in Public Act 428
cannot withstand constitutional attack since evidence of rec-
ord that the state discriminated against women is non-exis-
tent. Defendants' reliance upon general assertions of
societal discrimination are insufficient to satisfy their bur-
den absent some indication that the 'members of the gender
benefited by the classification actually suffer[ed] a disadvan-
tage related to the classification.'3 2
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the court of ap-
peals decision in Michigan Road Builders."
Since Croson established the evidentiary basis for use of race-
based classifications, standards required for gender-based pro-
grams will be no higher than those required to satisfy the
Croson tests. Thus, the critical articulation of the applicable ev-
identiary standards is found in the Croson decision.
In Croson, Justice O'Connor applied the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review: "Absent searching judicial inquiry into the jus-
tification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way
of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial'
and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate no-
tions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics.
34
Justice O'Connor was concerned with more than the deter-
mination of whether the use of racial classifications was reme-
dial or invidious. She was also concerned that, without
identified discrimination, there was no logical stopping point
used were "narrowly tailored" and "substantially related" to the achievement of its
goal of eradicating the present effects of prior discrimination. Id. at 595.
30. Id. at 584.
31. Id. See MICH. CoMp. LAws § 450.772 (1990).
32. Michigan Road Builders Assoc., 834 F. 2d at 595 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for
Women, 458 U.S. at 728).
33. See Milliken v. Michigan Road Builders Ass'n, Inc., 489 U.S. 1061 (1989).
34. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
1991]
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to the remedy. 5 In other words, evidence of discrimination
was necessary to first trigger a determination whether a racial
classification could be used, and second, it was necessary to
identify a specific remedy. The nature of the evidence is then
used to determine eligibility and to limit the nature of the
remedy. 6
The evidentiary standard, established in Croson, used to sup-
port the use of racial categories is that the evidence must "ap-
proach .. .a prima facie case of constitutional or statutory
violation. ' '3 7 This establishes the predicate facts upon which
remedial action can be based. Once these facts are estab-
lished, the focus of the inquiry changes to the nature of the
remedy adopted to assure that there are no sufficient race-neu-
tral alternatives and that the remedy adopted is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that remedial purpose. 8
II. WHO MUST HAVE DISCRIMINATED?
For there to have been discrimination, a person or group of
people must act or fail to act against another identified individ-
ual or group. Although the specific extent to which the evi-
dence must establish that discriminatory conduct is raised in
Croson, it is not completely answered. Justice O'Connor rejects
the argument that the government itself must have actively dis-
criminated before it can provide a remedy to victims of dis-
crimination. In discussing the scope of a city's authority to
adopt legislation designed to address the effects of past dis-
35. Id. at 498.
36. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) Fullilove involved the Minority
Business Enterprise provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L.
95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (Act). The Act required at least 10% of federal funds granted for
local public works projects to be used to procure services or supplies from minority-
owned businesses. Id. at 448. Evidence relied upon by Congress included the fact
that, while 16% of the population was nonwhite, only 3% of businesses were owned
by nonwhites and that nonwhite-owned businesses accounted for less than 1% of
total gross business receipts. The House Report concluded: "These statistics are not
the result of random chance. The presumption must be made that past discrimina-
tory systems have resulted in present economic inequalities." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at
465.
37. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500. Contrast this with the language in Fullilove, where
the Court stated: "Congress, of course, may legislate without compiling the kind of
'record' appropriate with respect to judicial or administrative proceedings." Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 478.
38. Croson, 488 U.S. at 506. The Court concluded that it is impossible to assess
whether the Richmond Plan is "narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination."
[Vol. 17
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crimination, she wrote: "[I]f the city could show that it had es-
sentially become a 'passive participant' in a system of racial
exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction in-
dustry, we think it clear that the city could take affirmative
steps to dismantle such a system."' 39 Thus, to provide a rem-
edy, a state or local government does not have to establish its
own active discrimination; it must show only that it was a "par-
ticipant" in a discriminatory system. State or local govern-
ments are not required to have established the system, but they
must show they were more than mere observers.
In adopting this standard, Justice O'Connor rejected Fulli-
love v. Klutznick 40 as inapplicable. The Court in Fullilove had
sustained a flexible minority set-aside program, adopted by
Congress in the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, with-
out such evidence. The Court distinguished Fullilove on the
basis that the fourteenth amendment enhances congressional
enforcement power in this area and serves as a restraint on the
exercise of authority by state and local governments.4' Justice
O'Connor also rejected the argument that Wygant v. Jackson
Board of Education 42 controlled, a precedent which would have
required specific proof that the city of Richmond itself had dis-
criminated. The court in Wygant had concluded that "some
showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit in-
volved"' 43 must be proven. While the state or local govern-
ment must be more than an observer in the discrimination
before it can provide a race-based remedy, the answer to the
question who may benefit from the remedy is less clear.
Legal scholars disagree about the need for evidence of spe-
cific discrimination to meet Croson's strict scrutiny standard.
Former Solicitor General Charles Fried argues, in response to
a statement issued by a group of constitutional scholars, that:
Croson is significant. For the first time a majority of the
39. Id. at 491. The Court also noted the state has an interest in preventing pub-
lic financing of the evils inherent in private prejudice. Id.
40. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
41. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490. See also Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 466-68 (1987)
(arguing that the majority in Fullilove wrote its own "post hoc" rationalizations of
evidence on which Congress could have reasonably relied, but in fact did not).
42. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
43. Id. at 274. "This Court never has held that societal discrimination alone is
sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court has insisted upon some
showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved before allowing
limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such discrimination." Id.
1991]
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Court holds unequivocally that all racial classifications ...
must pass strict scrutiny and be justified by a compelling
governmental purpose.... How far one must go in showing
that the identified discrimination was also 'purposeful' and
what 'purposefulness' means in this context are genuinely
difficult and controverted issues. I do suggest, however,
that the Court's recent jurisprudence makes it risky, to say
the least, for local authorities to rely on the scholars' confi-
dent reassurance that the conditions for justifying racial
preferences in this regard are not now quite rigorous.44
The constitutional scholars respond:
Fried suggests that Croson signals a substantial change in the
law of affirmative action because in that case a Supreme
Court majority adopted, for the first time, a test of strict
scrutiny for all racial classifications. But this overstates the
implications of the case. As noted above, Supreme Court
majorities, or Justices whose votes were crucial to majori-
ties, have applied strict scrutiny, and upheld affirmative ac-
tion programs, on many occasions. . . . Discrimination
against members of minority groups must overcome what is
virtually a conclusive presumption of unconstitutionality.
Affirmative action programs, even under strict scrutiny,
need not do so .... To think that Croson imposes a national
constitutional barrier-to be enforced by federal judges-to
such programs would be to read it as a startling departure
from the Court's cautious approach to the difficult problem
of remedying the long legacy of discrimination against
members of minority groups. We prefer to see Croson as the
pragmatic and particularistic opinion that it is.45
Whether the Croson case ultimately proves to be the "particu-
laristic" opinion the constitutional scholars believe it is or the
watershed described by Professor Fried, it cannot be doubted
that Croson has changed the legal, and thus the political, envi-
ronment for affirmative action programs.46 Significantly, that
change has placed a heavy evidentiary burden on state and lo-
44. Fried, Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Response to
the Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE LJ. 155, 156-58 (1989) [hereinafter Fried, Response]
(footnotes omitted).
45. Comment, Scholars' Reply to Professor Fried, 99 YALE L.J. 163, 165-66 (1989)
[hereinafter Comment, Scholars' Reply] (footnotes omitted).
46. The Court itself is widely divided over the breadth of its decision in Croson.
In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990), the Court sustained two
FCC policies intended to increase minority ownership of broadcast facilities. The
majority distinguished the decision from Croson, arguing that congressional approval
of the policies took the case outside of the strict scrutiny standards of Croson. Id. at
[Vol. 17
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cal governments which seek to provide race- or gender-based
affirmative action programs to members of their communities.
Following Croson, the Western District of Washington in
Coral Construction Co. v. King County47 sustained a challenge to
the King County set-aside program for construction purchas-
ing which had been re-enacted after hearings held in response
to the Croson decision. The Court applied Croson language so
as to limit its impact. The Court in Coral Construction concluded
that evidence of discrimination provided by "several dozen
people" was adequate to meet the Croson standards.48 While
the decision is a hopeful one, its cavalier treatment of the evi-
dentiary requirements of Croson is not easily reconciled with
the requirements established by the Supreme Court.
III. REQUIREMENTS OF A CROSON STUDY
The initial quandary posed by the Croson case for those en-
gaged in gathering and examining evidence of discrimination
required by the case is caused by the Court's lack of clarity.
From the language of the case, it seems clear that a govern-
mental unit seeking to use race or gender criteria would be
prudent to establish:
1. Discrimination against persons in the class of individuals
to be assisted by the program;
49
2. Government participation in the discrimination, or
passive participation in the otherwise established
discrimination;
50
3. Consideration of non-race or gender-based alternatives,
remedies and the reasons for their rejection; and
4. Evidence sufficient to focus a remedy with a limited du-
ration to benefit groups experiencing discrimination and
to minimize adverse impact on those affected by the
3008-09. The dissenters strongly disagreed and argued that the Croson strict scrutiny
standards did apply. Id. at 3029.
47. 729 F. Supp. 734 (W.D. Wash. 1989).
48. Id. at 737 (contrasting the written and oral descriptions of "specific exam-
ples" of discrimination evident in Coral Construction with the lack of direct evidence in
Croson). But, while the case was pending, King County government officials finished a
much more detailed and complete study of discrimination. A draft copy of that study
was filed with the court prior to its decision, but the court stated it was not consid-
ered in reaching its decision. Id. at 737 n.4. The county's program had sufficient
support without the inclusion of this report,
49. City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989).
50. Id. at 491.
1991]
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remedy.5'
In Croson, the Court indicated that it expects the use of statis-
tical measures similar to those used by the courts in employ-
ment discrimination cases to determine whether minority-
owned business firms are being under-used. The Court
quoted the well-known Hazelwood School District v. United States 52
decision stating, "[W]here gross statistical disparities can be
shown, they alone in a proper case may constitute prima facie
proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination."5
The statistical disparity that must be shown, according to
Croson, is the disparity between the available qualified pool of
minority-owned firms and their actual rate of employment.
Justice O'Connor wrote: "[W]here special qualifications are
necessary, the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demon-
strating exclusion must be the number of minorities qualified
to undertake the task."
54
The key to determining the relevant statistical pool is the
definition of the market. 55 However, the Court did not articu-
late how narrowly it intended to interpret the requirement of
identifying firms with "special qualifications." Justice
O'Connor found the city of Richmond's comparison between
the percentage of blacks in the city population and the value of
the city's prime contracts awarded to black-owned businesses
inadequate to justify a program designed to aid minority sub-
contractors. Would it be sufficient to identify the percentage
of the total number of businesses in the jurisdiction owned by
racial minorities and compare that to the value of contracts
awarded? If a narrower cut were taken, would using broad cat-
egories such as construction, retail and agriculture be ade-
quate, even though the construction category would include
every business ranging from single family home construction,
or bridge and tunnel construction to electrical and insulating
work? If Justice O'Connor's language about special qualifica-
51. Id. at 509.
52. 433 U.S. 299 (1977). The Court in Hazelwood held that the proper compari-
son was between "the racial composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and the racial
composition of the qualified public school teacher population in the relevant labor
market," not between the teaching staff and the student population. Id. at 308.
53. Croson, 488 U.S. at 501 (quoting Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08).
54. Id.
55. A disparity may not be found in two situations: 1) where the firms are being
used roughly in proportion to their availability; or 2) where there is not a significant
number of firms available with owners having specified race or gender characteristics.
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tions is to be taken seriously, it seems unlikely that a statistical
comparison which includes electrical contractors in the same
category with bridge contractors or highway contractors would
be considered valid.
Croson does not answer this question. The Court noted that
this is the approach utilized to establish a presumption of dis-
crimination in Title VII employment cases. In Wards Cove Pack-
ing v. Atonio,56 decided after Croson, the Court examined the
nature of appropriate measures for statistical comparison in
Title VII cases, and narrowed the scope of that comparison. A
brief examination of the arguments in Wards Cove reveals the
quagmire that states and cities may now be falling into as they
seek to develop the evidence required by Croson. In Wards Cove,
one of the issues discussed was how to determine the available
work force for noncannery seasonal employment. The Court
rejected a statistical comparison showing that the cannery
workforce was over 50% nonwhite while the noncannery
workforce (better paid and living in separate and better accom-
modations) was predominantly white. Justice White wrote:
Moreover, isolating the cannery workers as the potential la-
bor force for unskilled noncannery positions is at once both
too broad and too narrow in its focus. Too broad because
the vast majority of these cannery workers did not seek jobs
in unskilled noncannery positions; there is no showing that
many of them would have done so even if none of the ar-
guably "deterring" practices existed.... Conversely, if re-
spondents propose to use the cannery workers for
comparison purposes because they represent the "qualified
labor population" generally, the group is too narrow be-
cause there are obviously many qualified persons in the la-
bor market for noncannery jobs who are not cannery
workers.57
In dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that the structure of the
cannery industry renders any statistical comparison, other than
the internal workforce comparison offered, meaningless.58 In
a separate dissent, Justice Stevens further examined the ques-
tion of appropriate statistical comparisons. He wrote:
An undisputed requirement for employment either as a can-
56. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
57. Id. at 653-54.
58. Id. at 679 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting statistical proof in the cannery
case is impossible to obtain).
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nery or noncannery worker is availability for seasonal em-
ployment in the far reaches of Alaska. Many noncannery
workers, furthermore, must be available for preseason
work. Yet the record does not identify the portion of the
general population in Alaska, California, and the Pacific
Northwest that would accept this type of employment. This
deficiency respecting a crucial job qualification diminishes
the usefulness of petitioners' statistical evidence. In con-
trast, respondents' evidence, comparing racial compositions
within the work force, identifies a pool of workers willing to
work during the relevant times and familiar with the work-
ings of the industry. Surely this is more probative than the
untailored general population statistics on which petitioners
focus.5 9
Justice Stevens stated his view that prior precedent held that
the Court should not strive for "numerical exactitude at the
expense of the needs of the particular case" when reviewing
statistical evidence. 60 The implication of Justice Steven's dis-
sent is that he believed the Court had established a new, more
rigid standard for statistical comparisons.
Whether this stricter standard of defining relevant compari-
sons adopted by the Court in Wards Cove for Title VII cases will
be applied to affirmative action cases reviewed under the equal
protection clause is unknown. However, such a result appears
likely since Justice O'Connor outlined the Title VII standards
in her discussion of evidence necessary to satisfy the equal pro-
tection clause. The crucial question in the future will be how
narrowly a jurisdiction will be required to define these catego-
ries to meet the constitutional test when seeking to determine
if there is evidence of discrimination. The breadth of the defi-
nition for comparison will be an important determinant of the
ability of state and local governments to overcome the practi-
cal problems in complying with the Croson requirements. The
nature of these problems can be seen by reviewing the manner
in which the Minnesota study was prepared.
IV. THE MINNESOTA STUDY
The experience in Minnesota illustrates the immediate im-
pact of the Croson changes. Shortly after the Croson decision,
the Minnesota laws were challenged. Minnesota statutes re-
59. Id. at 676 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation and footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 674.
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quired specified units of government to use set-aside and pref-
erence programs to direct a portion of state procurement to
small businesses with ownership having certain characteristics.
Racial minorities and females were included.6 Suit was
brought in state district court62 and, in settling the case, the
state agreed to suspend existing state programs based on race
or gender classifications pending further legislative action.63
Because of the similarity of the Minnesota statute to that
struck down in Michigan Road Builders, the Minnesota Attorney
General's office advised settlement of the claims. The Legisla-
ture then adopted a temporary race- and gender-neutral pro-
gram for economically disadvantaged businesses. Businesses
which qualified under the race and gender criteria for set-aside
or preference programs were asked to re-apply under new cri-
teria. In addition to the temporary program, the Legislature
directed completion of a study to determine if there was evi-
dence sufficient under the Croson decision to support a race-
and gender-based program. 64 The Management Analysis Divi-
sion of the Minnesota Department of Administration, together
with a Legislative Commission on Small Business, conducted
the seven month, legislatively mandated study at a cost in ex-
cess of $100,000.65
A. Market Definition
The Minnesota study approached the question of special
qualifications by seeking to identify the market segments as
discretely as the data would allow.66 The basis for definition
61. See MINN. STAT. § 645.445 (5) (1988), repealed by Act of May 3, 1990, ch. 541,
§ 31, 1990 Minn. Laws 1476. The statute defined socially or economically eligible
businesses for the programs. The eligible businesses included those whose owners
lived or worked in a labor surplus area or an area having a county with 70% or less
than the state-wide average of racial minorities, women and individuals with substan-
tial physical disability. Id.
62. See Sorenson Bros., Inc. v. Levine, CX-89-3463 (2d D. Minn. Apr. 14, 1989).
63. Id. See Stipulation and Order for Dismissal at 4-5.
64. Small Business Procurements Commission, ch. 352, §§ 1, 22, 1989 Minn.
Laws 3169, 3183 (The legislation also created a Small Business Procurements Com-
mission to gather evidence on discrimination and make recommendations to the
Legislature.).
65. Id. See A FooT IN THE DOOR, supra note 11.
66. The assumption of the study was that if a future program were challenged,
Minnesota could show that every effort was made to secure detailed information. If
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was the Standard Industrial Classification Manual (SIC Man-
ual) which is arranged to allow categorization on a number of
ever more distinct characteristics.6 7
The Minnesota study sought to identify available data suita-
ble for statistical comparison using four-digit SIC codes. It
was possible to secure purchasing data from government files
which could be re-organized into SIC codes, but it was not
possible to estimate the proportion of women- and minority-
owned firms on anything smaller than the three-digit industry
codes. Thus, the Minnesota study was based on a market,
or special qualification definition, based on three-digit SIC
codes.68
B. Firm Availability
The second piece of necessary information is the estimate of
the proportion of women- and minority-owned firms available
in each of these markets. No current, reliable data exists on
this point. 69 The Minnesota study estimated the proportion of
available firms which were women- and minority-owned
through a random sample survey of state firms doing business
in forty-one major SIC codes. Based on discussions with state
officials, the codes selected were those including firms most
likely to be doing business with the government. 70  Because
67. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION MANUAL (1987) [hereinafter SIC MANUAL].
For example, Division C is construction. Within that division are three major
groups: Group 15: Building construction; Group 16: Heavy construction other than
building construction contractors; and Group 17: Construction, special trade con-
tractors. In turn, each major group is divided. Under Group 17 is industry group
179 - Miscellaneous Special Trade Contractors. A subdivision of that industry group
is Industry No. 1793, Glass and Glazing Work. Another subdivision is Industry No.
1794, Excavation Work. Id. at 61.
68. State government purchasing data, when it was maintained in a computerized
database, was coded with over 2,500 different product codes to identify the type of
purchase. These codes were unrelated to the SIC method of coding. It was neces-
sary to aggregate them to have them conform to the SIC manual to develop usable
purchasing data.
69. The 1982 Census of Women- and Minority-owned businesses is old and the
estimates of women-owned firms are biased upward due to the method of counting
used. The 1987 Census data is not yet available. When it becomes available, it will
be published using broad categories such as construction and retail, thus creating
reliability problems.
70. Prior Minnesota state law required the use of set-asides or preference
purchasing by state government, the University of Minnesota, and metropolitan
agencies, such as the Metropolitan Airports Commission. Purchasing information
was obtained from each of these governmental units.
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the sampling needed to be stratified by SIC code, it was neces-
sary to survey over fifteen thousand business firms. Three-
digit SIC codes were selected and the survey was conducted
statewide. The limited number of firms operating in some
markets and areas of the state made it impossible to develop a
sufficiently large sample to allow additional geographic or SIC
code detail.
Several potential problems arose when developing data on
this basis. The random sample of firms was based on a com-
puter generated random sampling by SIC code of the list main-
tained by the Department of Jobs and Training.7' The
Minnesota Department of Jobs and Training has personnel
who are trained to examine information submitted to the De-
partment and classify the firm in the SIC code of its primary
operation. Many firms conduct operations that may fall into
more than one SIC code classification. Thus, the actual
number of firms available for a particular type of work may
have differed substantially from those reflected in the SIC code
listing. However, no other data source provided a more relia-
ble estimate. Another problem was that of job and firm size.
The survey of firms sought information on firm size which
could be correlated to race and gender of ownership character-
istics. However, no way was found to correlate that infor-
mation with the information available on purchasing
opportunities.
Finally, it was not possible to develop information which re-
flected the geographic markets within the state. An attempt
was made to develop statistically valid samples by the eco-
nomic zones within the state. In many instances, however,
there were too few firms in each zone for practical use of
sampling.
C. Purchasing Information
The third piece of information necessary to perform the sta-
tistical comparison is the proportion of total dollars spent on
women- and minority-owned firms in that market. Attempts to
secure reliable information about the private market proved
71. The Minnesota Department of Revenue also maintains a database of busi-
nesses. Preliminary investigation indicated the information would be unreliable for
the study purposes. For example, some multi-location operations filed tax forms sep-
arately while others filed on a consolidated basis.
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unsuccessful. As a result, the study focused on and analyzed
government purchasing.72
While the Croson Court discussed the proper comparison in
terms of the proportion of dollars received by minority firms,
7 3
that comparison may be misleading. There may be situations
where one or two firms are receiving large dollar contracts and
the remainder of the minority firms are being excluded from
the process altogether. 74  As a result, the Minnesota study
gathered information to allow comparison of the proportion of
purchasing opportunities secured by women- and minority-
owned firms as well as the proportion of dollars. The final re-
port's recommendations were based on comparisons of firms
to dollars awarded, since the differences between the two
measures in Minnesota were insignificant.
D. Results of the Statistical Comparisons
The overall occurrence of underutilization is shown in Table
1. It is easiest to understand by way of example. When the
category of nonresidential building construction was examined
in the records of the Minnesota Department of Administration,
an underutilization of female-owned firms was found. Table 1
shows that a disparity in the use of female-owned businesses
occurred 100% of the time in the category of nonresidential
building construction in the databases examined. The table
shows that no disparity was found in the category for black- or
Hispanic-owned businesses; 40% of the databases reflected
disparity for American Indian-owned firms, and 80% for
Asian-owned firms.
72. The most intractable problem proved to be the inconsistent manner in which
data was kept. For example, the University of Minnesota's purchases were not com-
puterized and were filed in numerical sequence. Thus, the situation made it impossi-
ble to sample by the market-type of transaction. Fortunately, many other data
sources were computerized or maintained in paper files by the market-type of the
transaction.
73. City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500-03 (1989) (Information
on minority participation in the relevant market is necessary in order to evaluate
overall minority representation in city expenditures.).
74. Interview with Helen Slesserav, social scientist employed by Chicago City At-
torney, in Chicago, Ill. (Sept. 20, 1989).
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PERCENTAGE INCIDENCE OF DISPARITY IN GOVERNMENT
PURCHASING, BY PRODUCT CATEGORY
7 5
Type of Government Purchasing
Nonresidential building
construction







Carpentry and floor work















Hardware, plumbing and heating
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Miscellaneous durable goods
Paper and paper products












Female Black panic Indian Asian
100 0 0 40 80


















100 33 33 17







100 0 0 0
100 80 20 0
100 50 0 0 0
100 100 100 0 100
75. STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION, supra note 11, at 25-26.
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Auto repair 100 33 33 0 0
Auto services, except repair 100 0 0 0 0
Reupholstery and furniture services 100 100 0 0 0
Medical and dental labs 100 0 0 0 0
Engineering and architectural
services 100 20 80 0 100
Accounting services 100 0 0 0 0
Research and testing services 100 0 0 0 0
Management and public relations
services 80 80 20 0 100
E. Other Evidence
The Minnesota study sought additional sources of informa-
tion to identify specific problems encountered by women- and
minority-owned firms. Problems identified included whether
underutilization was a systemic problem that could be ad-
dressed through the development of nonrace- or nongender-
based programs. The Minnesota study looked for information
which would identify differences between the experiences of
women- and minority-owned firms and those owned and oper-
ated by white males and would provide evidence of discrimina-
tory impact.7 6
F. Testimony and Affidavits
In addition to the statistical study, a series of hearings were
conducted around the state of Minnesota to gather testimony
and affidavits on discrimination. Seventy-five individuals
either presented testimony or submitted affidavits at these
hearings. A summary of the testimony was prepared and sub-
mitted to the legislature.77
76. Concerns about the Croson definition of relevant markets and the variability in
the purchasing data available for the statistical comparisons prompted a decision to
seek broader measures of discrimination through survey techniques. The survey
used data gathered by the University of Minnesota Survey Research Center. The
reliability of this type of survey evidence has been sustained by courts in discrimina-
tion cases. See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988). In Keith, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's findings regarding the
discriminatory effect of a city's actions. The district court relied upon a 1980 census
data survey. The 1980 survey was a door-to-door and telephone survey of residents
in the relevant census tracts. The district court also used information contained in
the State Department of Transportation files which included data on the residents'
race, income and housing preferences.
77. See generally A FooT IN THE DOOR, supra note 11.
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A database containing the responses of white, male business
owners to questions about their experiences starting firms in
Minnesota was identified.78 In order to develop evidence on
the incidence of discrimination by means of comparison, many
of the questions from the survey form used for that study were
repeated in a survey of identified women- and minority-owned
firms. 79 The results of the survey and its comparison with the
responses of white, male business owners show the existence
of extensive discrimination, with substantial variations between
race and gender categories.
More than one-third of those business owners responding to
the survey stated a belief that their businesses had been sub-
jected to discrimination because of their race or gender.
Nineteen percent said they had been discouraged from begin-
ning their businesses because of their race or gender. The ex-
tent of reported discrimination varied by race or gender (Table
2). A larger percentage of black business owners reported ex-
periencing discrimination than did other groups. Black busi-
ness owners also reported more separate incidents of
discrimination.
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE FREQUENCY OF DISCRIMINATION 8 0
Ownership of Business
His-
Female Black panic Indian Asian
Those Reporting Race or Gender
Discrimination 30 57 41 29 49
Reported Instances of
Discrimination
0 2 6 0 0 0
1-5 68 39 44 71 69
5-10 11 11 31 19 19
More than 10 19 44 25 10 12
Reported Instances of Discourage-
ment from Entering Business Be-
cause of Race or Gender 20 32 26 15 22
78. P. REYNOLDS & B. MILLER, 1987 MINNESOTA NEW FIRMS STUDY: AN EXPLORA-
TION OF NEW FIRMS AND THEIR ECONOMIC CONTRIBUrONS (1987).
79. The survey, conducted by the University of Minnesota Survey Research
Center, was based on firms identified through government certification lists, trade
lists and other association lists.
80. STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION, supra note 11, at 47.
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Business owners who reported discrimination were asked to
identify the primary sources of that discrimination. As Table 3
indicates, these responses also show considerable variation by
race and gender.
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF REPORTED FREQUENCY OF SOURCES
OF DISCRIMINATION 8 1
Source of Discrimination Ownership of Business
His-
Female Black panic Indian Asian
Purchasing (nongovernment) 23 40 47 39 56
Purchasing (government) 29 30 41 48 22
Prime contractors 32 43 35 39 44
Subcontractors 18 23 12 13 11
Lending institutions 33 48 35 22 17
Bonding 5 28 2 9 11
In an effort to gain more specific information, business own-
ers were asked to respond to questions about the nature of the
reported discrimination (Table 4).
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF REPORTED FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION
8 2
Form of Discrimination Ownership of Business
His-
Female Black panic Indian Asian
Late notice 26 46 20 41 35
Bid not accepted 29 46 33 32 18
Shopping on bid8 3  29 56 27 27 24
Using higher bid 30 54 66 50 35
Business owners were asked whether they had reported any
incidents of discrimination to organizations such as human
rights offices or trade associations. The frequency with which
such experiences were reported was quite low (Table 5).
81. Id. at 48.
82. Id. at 49.
83. "Shopping on bid" refers to the practice of using one firm's bid to secure
more favorable quotations from other companies.
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Female Black panic Indian Asian
Percent Reporting that Action was
Taken to Report the
Discrimination 6 10 0 4 6
Women- and minority-owned firms also were asked a series
of questions about the nature of the problems they faced when





























27 49 36 33 38
17 37 19 24 30
26 32 26 24 32
13 35 14 21 21
24 25 22 32 34
26 34 21 20 38
Respondents who experienced these problems were asked
the extent to which they had been able to resolve the problem.
Business owners could report the problem as fully resolved,
partially resolved or not resolved. Table 7 reflects the percent-
age of business owners who reported these major problems
and considered the problem unresolved.
84. Id. at 49.
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TABLE 7




























33 63 25 44 36
16 36 38 26 16
16 34 21 18 21
31 50 44 44 31
25 46 23 35 44
24 33 32 32 25
H. Impact of Set-Aside and Preference Programs
Minnesota has had a set-aside and purchasing preference
program for the benefit of socially and economically disadvan-
taged business owners since the mid-1970s. Data was col-
lected to identify the impact of awards made under these
programs on women- and minority-owned businesses.
The purchasing analysis examined the extent to which the
set-aside and preference programs had increased the participa-
tion of women- and minority-owned businesses in government
purchasing. When state purchases made by the Department of
Administration with the use of set-aside or preference pro-
grams were removed from the totals, the number of categories
with statistically significant disparities of black-owned firms in-
creased. In many cases, the removal increased the size of the
disparity in other categories as well.
In other databases, the removal of data regarding contracts
using set-aside or preference programs did not change the
number of categories where underutilization existed, but did
increase the amount of the disparity. This seemingly small ef-
fect on eliminating categories with a statistical disparity oc-
86. Id. at 51.
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curred because white male-owned firms qualifying under the
labor surplus or 70% median income designation received a
disproportionately large share of set-aside or preference
awards.
For example, of the ten SIC codes in the sample where set-
aside and preference data was sufficient for statistical testing,
white male-owned firms received a statistically significant
higher proportion of the awards in four categories. In two cat-
egories, they received awards approximating their share of the
market and, in four categories, they received a less than pro-
portionate share. For the set-aside or preference program to
reduce the underutilization of women- and minority-owned
firms in government purchasing programs, it is necessary for
white male-owned firms to be awarded a less than proportion-
ate share of set-aside or preference awards in all categories.
Information about the impact of the programs was also
sought through the survey of women- and minority-owned
businesses (Table 8). Of all respondents surveyed, 59% re-
ported that they participated in purchasing preference pro-
grams. Forty-six percent reported that the preference
program increased their nongovernment business. Almost
40% responded that they would be only marginally viable or
not viable at all without the programs. Table 8 sets out the
results of a series of questions, showing this pattern of experi-
ence by race and gender.
TABLE 8
IMPACT OF PREFERENCE/SET-ASIDE PROGRAMS, BY
PERCENTAGE REPORTING
8 7
Questions Ownership of Business
His-
Female Black panic Indian Asian
Participated in preference or set-
aside programs?
Yes 58 72 52 61 67
If yes, awarded contracts or
purchases because of programs?
Yes 62 57 74 69 56
87. Id. at 52.
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Is the firm viable without the
programs?
Yes 68 33 55 42 64
Marginally 21 52 32 46 32
No 11 15 14 12 4
Has the program enhanced firm
profits?
Yes, a lot 15 21 36 18 25
Yes, a little 49 47 41 56 33
No 36 31 23 27 4
Has the program increased your
nongovernment business?
Yes, a lot 10 28 36 23 29
Yes, a little 32 33 36 32 13
No 58 40 27 46 58
Despite the fact that the programs eliminated disparity in
only a few instances, the survey shows that firms participating
in the programs found that their financial viability was im-
proved and, for at least 40%, it increased their nongovernment
business.
V. RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES AND A "NARROWLY
TAILORED" REMEDY
Once the threshold evidence of discrimination is established
through statistical and other evidence, the focus of the judicial
inquiry under Croson shifts to the nature of the remedy
adopted. 8 8 Justice O'Connor noted several points regarding
the remedy in Croson. First, there was no evidence that the
Richmond City Council considered any alternatives to a race-
based quota. O'Connor stated:
Many of the barriers to minority participation in the con-
struction industry relied upon by the city to justify a racial
classification appear to be race neutral. If MBEs dispropor-
tionately lack capital or cannot meet bonding requirements,
a race-neutral program of city financing for small firms
would, afortiori, lead to greater minority participation.
8 9
Second, O'Connor noted that the 30% quota adopted by
Richmond was not narrowly tailored because it was not related
to any goal except racial balancing. 90 She rejected both the
theory that minorities will select employment in proportion to
88. City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 469 (1989).
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their representation in the local population and also any argu-
ment that the administrative ease of a quota helps justify its
use. O'Connor stated: "Under Richmond's scheme, a success-
ful black, Hispanic or Oriental entrepreneur from anywhere in
the country enjoys an absolute preference over other citizens
based solely on their race. We think it obvious that such a pro-
gram is not narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of prior
discrimination." 9'
The decision in Croson requires states and cities to examine
race-neutral alternatives and to narrowly tailor any race-based
remedies it uses. However, the guidelines are ambiguous.
There are two interesting components to the problem. First,
who may benefit from a narrowly tailored remedy? Justice
O'Connor rejected including nonresident businesses in the
plan. Does this mean that a black-owned firm with its principle
place of business elsewhere in Virginia, or in another state,
cannot be eligible without specific proof of discrimination oc-
curring within the city of Richmond?9 2 Next, the Court failed
to define relevant time periods. Does Croson prohibit any busi-
ness formed after adoption of the statute or ordinance from
being eligible on the grounds that the firm could not have ex-
perienced the historic discrimination being remedied? While
such a result seems strained, if the Court is serious when it
requires that evidence of historic discrimination be used to
provide an "ending point" for the remedy, such a distinction
may be necessary.
The second ambiguous area is the extent to which Croson re-
quires evidence that race-neutral alternatives are not an ade-
quate remedy. In Coral Construction, the district court
addressed the question in its review of the MBE plan of King
County, Washington.93 The plaintiffs argued that the county
did not consider several possible race-neutral alternatives.
The court stated; "Croson does not compel the county to con-
sider every imaginable race-neutral alternative, nor to try alter-
91. Id. at 509-10.
92. See Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 729 F. Supp. 734 (W.D. Wash. 1989).
The Coral Construction court side-stepped the question by concluding: "Some of the
present record refers to evidence of discrimination outside King County and/or the
construction industry.... Even when all such evidence is disregarded, however, the
remaining evidence is fully sufficient to support the county's finding of past discrimi-
nation in the King County construction industry." Id. at 737 n.6.
93. Id. at 739.
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natives that would be plainly ineffective."9 4
Every race-neutral alternative may not have to be considered
under Croson. However, the question remains whether the
Croson standard requires that race-neutral efforts will have to
be attempted prior to the use of race or gender classifications.
If, for example, studies showed that black-owned firms were
hampered by a lack of working capital, would the Court re-
quire the city or state to adopt and evaluate a neutral program
increasing working capital before it could use a race- or gen-
der-based alternative?
In Minnesota, the data allows the question of neutral alter-
natives to be finessed because there is no statistical relation
between the level of business problems and underutilization.
Female-owned businesses consistently reported the lowest
level of major problems and problems remaining unsolved.
Yet, the statistical disparity showing underuse was found in al-
most every line of business examined. Thus, there does not
appear to be a correlation between the level of specific
problems and the extent of underutilization shown by the
Croson test. A troubling question is whether a court will allow
that finding to be applied by a legislature to racial minorities.
Again, if a court strictly applies the requirement to narrowly
tailor any remedy, it may require prior experimentation with
race-neutral alternatives to correct the disparity for racial mi-
norities before race-based programs can be adopted. The
court could then argue that there is no evidence that underu-
tilization will not be cured for firms owned by racial minorities.
VI. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE MINNESOTA STUDY
Several conclusions can be reached applying the Croson stan-
dards, ambiguous though they may be, to the data from the
Minnesota study. The Minnesota sample showed most consist-
ently the underutilization of women-owned firms in govern-
ment purchasing. It also revealed underutilization of minority-
owned firms which varied by market, race and gender.95 The
study established that there was statistical evidence of underu-
94. Id.
95. The cause of this variation is not explained by the Croson test. The variation
may exist because minority-owned firms are being used by the government relative to
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tilization of women- and minority-owned businesses in govern-
ment purchasing but that the extent of underuse varied by
market, race and gender category.
The survey results also established that many individuals
were discouraged from entering business because of their race
or gender. Firms that have experienced multiple incidents of
discrimination and firms owned by racial minorities generally
experienced a higher level of business problems and greater
difficulty in solving those problems than white, male business
owners. The study also showed that while prior set-aside and
preference programs eliminated the disparity in only a few in-
stances, the programs assisted many of these business owners
by increasing their financial viability and ability to obtain
nongovernment business.
Finally, and significantly, the study showed that women-
owned businesses experienced the lowest level of business
problems, yet faced the most consistent underutilization. This
illustrates the intractable nature of a problem that probably
cannot be "fixed" by addressing specific business problems.
In other words, the link between specific business problems
and the rate of underutilization implied by Justice O'Connor in
requiring examination and rejection of race neutral alterna-
tives does not appear to exist.
VII. THE INAPPROPRIATE STANDARD OF CROSON
The results of the Minnesota study are not surprising. Ra-
cism and sexism remain prevalent in American society.96 What
is surprising is the Supreme Court's decision which invalidates
efforts by duly elected legislative officials to find ways to assure
that more opportunities are given to those who are not white
males. The problems with the Croson standards occur at sev-
eral levels: technical, practical and philosophical.
A. Technical Problems with the Croson Test
Two technical questions arise in analyzing the statistical tests
formulated in Croson: First, how accurate is the measure, and
second, is the measure being taken of the correct question?
96. See, e.g., McFadden, A Row House is Set Afire; Bias is Cited, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9,
1990 at BI, col. 5.
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B. Accuracy
The statistical measure outlined in Croson will understate the
extent of discrimination in the business world for several rea-
sons. First, understatement occurs because of the chilling ef-
fect that discrimination has in deterring business entrants.
The Minnesota study shows that 20% of women business own-
ers had been discouraged from entering their businesses be-
cause of their gender. Thirty-two percent of black business
owners and 26% percent of the Hispanic business owners re-
ported having been discouraged from entering business be-
cause of their race. These business owners reporting
proceeded despite this discouragement and were counted in
determining the statistical disparity. But those who were dis-
couraged, and did not persevere, could never be considered
under the Court's statistical approach.
The underestimate of discrimination also occurs in a second
way. White males, white females and minorities tend to enter
different lines of business.9 7 In her analysis of the 1987 New
Firms Study database, Brenda Miller, University of Minnesota,
Center for Urban and Regional Affairs (CURA), concluded:
"Firms owned by racial minorities were more likely to be in the
service category, both producer and consumer services, and
less likely in retail. In contrast, female-owned businesses were
underrepresented in manufacturing.
98
This conclusion was corroborated by the survey of fifteen
thousand Minnesota businesses in the forty-one major SIC
codes. The lines of business having the highest proportion of
black-owned businesses were: services to buildings; automo-
bile services, except repair; reupholstery and furniture repair;
telephone communications; medical instruments and supplies;
and heavy construction, except highway. In each of these cate-
gories, black-owned businesses made up at least 1.5% of the
total number of firms. In eleven of the forty-one major SIC
codes, the survey identified no black-owned firms. Similarly, in
a varying number of major SIC codes, no Hispanic-, Asian- or
Indian-owned firms were identified. 99
These findings raise the question of the reasons behind this
97. See Miller, A Comparison by Race and Gender of New Venture Start Experiences, in
STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION, supra note 11, at iv.
98. Id.
99. See generally STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION, supra note 11.
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difference. The Minnesota study made no independent at-
tempt to answer that question. However, John Heywood, writ-
ing in the Review of Black Political Economy, found that because
the retail and service sectors are the most competitive, and
market power is the least concentrated, discriminatory barriers
cannot be maintained in these markets. In his study, he found
the share of black ownership in the most competitive industries
to be almost ten times the black ownership in industry groups
that are highly concentrated and the least competitive. Hey-
wood pointed out that the less competitive and more concen-
trated industries are the most profitable, and thus economic
theory would expect more entrants to those fields.'0° He con-
cluded that blacks are not entering those potentially more
profitable lines of business because of residual discrimination.
If, in fact, women and minorities are being discouraged from
entering business and, in particular, face discriminatory barri-
ers in certain industry groups, requiring legislative bodies to
rely on statistical disparities based on currently available firms
will only prevent legislative action to eliminate discrimina-
tion. t° 1 Justice O'Connor has stated that there is sufficient
nexus between government's passive participation in a dis-
criminatory market and the discrimination to allow state af-
firmative action under the equal protection clause.' 0 2 Yet, the
test O'Connor subscribes to as a measure of that discrimina-
tion assures that such discrimination will be consistently
underestimated.
That underestimation will be exacerbated if the market defi-
nition, eventually required by Croson for statistical comparison,
follows the narrow construction of Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio. 10 3 For example, in the eleven SIC codes in the Minne-
sota study where no black-owned firms were identified, the sta-
100. Heywood, Market Structure and the Pattern of Black-Owned Firms, 16 REV. BLACK
POL. ECON. 65, 71-72 (Spring 1988).
101. A statistical disparity may not be found for two reasons: (1) if the firms are
being used roughly in proportion to their availability; or (2) there are no significant
numbers of firms available with owners having specified race or gender characteris-
tics. If, for example, there are no black business owners in electrical contracting be-
cause of discrimination, a strict application of the Croson statistical test will not permit
race-based legislative action to correct that discrimination.
102. City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,492 (1989). Justice O'Connor
further stated that the city should take affirmative steps to dismantle the system of
racial exclusion. Id.
103. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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tistical test will show no underutilization. If the test must be
drawn that narrowly, a legislature will not be able to take af-
firmative action with respect to black-owned firms operating or
seeking to operate in those lines of business because it will not
have evidence of prior discrimination in those markets. This
will be true even though the legislature has survey data indicat-
ing firms have been discriminated against generally and that
black-owned firms experience a higher level of business
problems. If Justice O'Connor is to be taken literally, survey
evidence not specifically tied to a line of business (e.g. con-
struction), may not, standing alone, be adequate evidence of
discrimination. Since the survey identified no black-owned
firms currently operating in that line of business, there is no
statistical disparity and hence no evidence of past discrimina-
tion. 04 Thus, the more narrowly the Court requires the mar-
ket to be defined to establish a statistical disparity, the more
undercounting can occur.
Another technical problem with the test, as the Court has
established it, is its reliance on the proportion of dollars,
rather than opportunities, awarded to minority firms.' 0 5 As
discussed previously, one or two firms may secure an award
with a large dollar value which would eliminate the disparity in
the market when the Court's test is used. However, if the rest
of the minority firms were consistently excluded from purchas-
ing decisions in the market, that fact would be masked by the
test selected by the Court. 0 6 As a result, a test based both on
the population dollars awarded and on the number of opportu-
nities provided assures that the opportunities to participate in
the business are actually available, as well as measuring the
104. It is important to note that the survey of women and minority business own-
ers includes answers from owners operating in all lines of business. In a state with
relatively few minorities, obtaining and identifying a large enough sample of firms
within each line of business would be extremely difficult.
105. Croson, 488 U.S. at 502.
106. This is the situation in at least one purchasing category identified by re-
searchers for the Chicago City Attorney. In the Chicago study, one minority-owned
firm received a large city contract, the dollar value of which was large enough to
eliminate any statistical disparity. When the measure was opportunities, rather than
dollars, the disparity was substantial. Interview with Helen Slesserav, social scientist
employed by Chicago City Attorney, in Chicago, Ill. (Sept. 20, 1989). This was not
the case in the Minnesota study where evidence was gathered for both opportunities
and dollars. While different results occurred depending on the measure, the number
of categories with statistical disparities did not increase when the measure was oppor-
tunities rather than dollars.
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dollar value of awards which may be going only to a few
firms. 107
C. Appropriateness
The statistical test established in Croson calls for a compari-
son between two proportions. For example, the proportion of
available black-owned firms in a market was compared with the
proportion of dollars awarded to black-owned firms in that
market. 0 "8 The difference between those two proportions is
identified, and a statistical test is applied to determine the like-
lihood that the difference is the result of a random event.'0 9
Thus, when the Court declared that the statistical test will raise
the presumption of discrimination, the test actually concluded
that there is a probability that the difference between availabil-
ity and dollars awarded was not the result of a random event.
In other words, something caused it, but the test could not
identify that cause."O
Recognizing this inherent limitation in the use of statistical
tests, the Croson test assumed that each purchasing decision is a
random event."' In Castaneda v. Partida," the Court dis-
cussed the use of binomial distribution modelling."t 3 A Mexi-
can-American indicted by a grand jury alleged denial of due
process and equal protection because of underrepresentation
of Mexican-Americans on Texas grand juries. The Court com-
pared the results under Texas' "key-man" system ofjury selec-
tion to the probable results under a random selection
method." '4 It noted that a random selection method would
107. It is still possible that one or two firms could secure all the opportunities as
well as the awards. However, performing the statistical tests on both dollar value of
awards and the number of opportunities will increase the likelihood that the results
reflect actual purchasing events.
108. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492.
109. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1989).
110. Similarly,Justice White, defending the majority opinion in Wards Cove against
Justice Blackmun's attacks, wrote: "Of course, it is unfortunately true that race dis-
crimination exists in our country. That does not mean, however, that it exists at the
canneries-or more precisely, that it has been proven to exist at the canneries." Id.
at 2126 n.4. See also P. MEIER, J. SACKS & S. ZADELL, STATISTICS AND THE LAw (1986).
111. The test assumes a binomial distribution where all the firms have an equal
opportunity for each dollar awarded.
112. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
113. Id. at 496 n.17.
114. Id. The "key-man" system relies on the jury commissioner to select prospec-
tive jurors from the community-at-large. Prospective jurors are drawn from a list
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probably avoid most of the potential for abuse found in the
more subjective "key-man" system."15
In Hazelwood School District v. United States,"t 6 the Court also
addressed the use of statistical comparisons. In Hazelwood, the
federal government brought an action alleging the school dis-
trict and various officials were engaging in a pattern of teacher
employment discrimination. In discussing the role of statistics
in employment discrimination cases, the Court stated that,
"[w]here gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone
may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern
or practice of discrimination.""' 7 The test was premised on
the assumption that " 'absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be
expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time
result in a work force more or less representative of the racial
and ethnic composition of the population in the community
from which employees are hired.' "118
The Hazelwood Court determined the relevant comparison to
be the racial composition of the qualified public school teacher
population in the relevant labor market and the racial compo-
sition of Hazelwood's teaching staff.' 9 A binomial distribu-
tion requires an assumption that each certified teacher would
have an identical chance for employment at Hazelwood. This
assumption seems less likely to actually occur (and is perhaps
less socially desirable) than the assumptions made in the case
of grand juror selection. In Hazelwood, it was used to create a
rebuttable presumption. 
20
A model based on random selection is necessary for the se-
lection of grand jurors to assure all citizens an equal chance of
prepared by appointed jury commissioners. The prospective jurors are then sum-
moned to court, where a district judge interrogates them under oath to determine
whether they meet certain statutory qualifications. After the judge finds 12 jurors
who meet the qualifications, they are impanelled as the grand jury. Id. at 484-85.
Although the Texas system of selecting grand jurors is highly subjective, the courts
have upheld its facial constitutionality. Id. at 497.
115. Id. at 497 n.18.
116. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
117. Id. at 307-08. The Hazelwood Court validated the test later applied in Wards
Cove, comparing racial composition of the qualified persons in the relevant labor mar-
ket and the persons holding at-issuejobs. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642, 654 (1989).
118. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307 (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977)).
119. Id. at 308.
120. Id. at 309.
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being selected to serve. 12  A random selection model can also
be used to create a rebuttable presumption during the eviden-
tiary portion of a trial. The model seems less appropriate
when used, as suggested by Croson, to establish a minimum
standard which triggers legitimate, affirmative activity by a duly
constituted legislative body.
WhenJustice O'Connor stated the evidence must "approach
a prima facie case of constitutional or statutory violation," 122
she implied that the statistical disparities which give rise to
presumptions of discrimination during employment will, when
presented to a legislative body, allow that body to make race or
gender classifications so long as they can be shown to be a nar-
rowly tailored response to the evidence of discrimination. But
the relevant model on which legislative action should be based
is one which would show what the market and current purchas-
ing decisions would look like if there had been no race or gen-
der discrimination. Yet, that is precisely the question that
Justice O'Connor rejected as being too speculative. 123 While
clearly more desirable, results of that model cannot be approx-
imated by the statistical test outlined in Croson.
Two problems then arise from the tests outlined in Croson.
First, requiring that legislative action occur only after deter-
mining the existence of a statistical disparity means that a leg-
islature will be forced to rely on a test which understates the
existence of discrimination. Second, the test answers the
wrong question. The Court misses the point by examining the
legitimacy of government seeking to increase participation in
the economic and social life of the jurisdiction. The Court asks
the question: Are we ninety-five percent confident that the dif-
ference between two proportions is not a random event?
12 4
The question should be: What would a discrimination-free
121. In selecting jurors, it is socially beneficial for each member of the community
to have an equal chance to sit on a jury, since a jury is to be a body of community
peers. In Castaneda, the Court stated,
This Court has long recognized that it is a denial of the equal protection of
the laws to try a defendant of a particular race or color under an indictment
issued by a grand jury . .. from which all persons of his race or color have,
solely because of that race or color, been excluded by the State...
Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 492; see Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309.
122. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989).
123. Id.
124. Id. Justice O'Connor further stated that allowing speculative discrimination
to be identified would allow local governments to "create a patchwork of ... statisti-
cal generalizations about any particular field of endeavor." Id.
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marketplace look like and how far away are we? But that ques-
tion is not reliable when examined by quantitative methods,
particularly when the evaluation will be made in a legislative
process and not in the structured world of courtroom practice.
VIII. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CROSON TEST
Under Croson, once a state or local government concludes
there may be a problem with discrimination in its jurisdiction,
it must gather evidence.' 25 This requires funding a study and
specifying its methodology. Because of the ambiguity of the
Croson decision, it may be that the several hundred thousand
dollars spent by the cities of Seattle, San Francisco and the
state of Minnesota' 26 will have been in vain if the Court ulti-
mately concludes that, for example, the statistical comparisons
have not been made with a fine enough gradation to constitute
evidence of historic discrimination in a market.
Attempting to use the data gathered to fashion a narrowly
tailored remedy presents another problem. There are two key
questions here. First, by what standards will a conclusion that
race- or gender-neutral alternatives are insufficient be judged
by a reviewing court? In other words, how much evidence will
be enough? For example, can the Minnesota Legislature as-
sume that, since the highest level of underutilization and the
lowest level of problems are found with women-owned firms,
attempting to fix business problems on a gender-neutral basis
will not eliminate the underutilization of women-owned firms?
Secondly, by what standards will a remedy that is adopted be
assessed by a reviewing court? Is it necessary that a remedy be
tailored to each defined market by identifiable race and gender
differences in that market, or will a broad remedy, based on
the findings of discrimination in sampled markets, applicable
to broadly-stated race and gender categories and broadly-
stated lines of business be allowed?
In those SIC codes where the Minnesota study found no
black-owned firms operating and thus no statistical disparity,
125. Id. at 505. (Prior to a state or local government taking action, "they must
identify that discrimination, public or private, with some specificity .... ").
126. A recent survey of jurisdictions with studies completed or underway con-
ducted by the Office of Minority Business Affairs for the State of Rhode Island indi-
cates a study cost range between $50,000 and $600,000, depending on the size of the
jurisdiction and the complexity of the study. Interview with Charles Newton, Coordi-
nator for Minority Business Affairs for Rhode Island, in Providence, R.I. (Aug. 1990).
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may the Legislature include black-owned firms in those lines of
business when granting a purchasing preference on the basis
that a disparity was found against women and at least one
other minority group in that category? Or, may the Legisla-
ture adopt a program providing set-asides and preferences in
all lines of state purchasing, even though the Minnesota study
used only specific government purchaser's records? Professor
Fried's reading of Croson would prevent such inclusion. It is
arguable that the constitutional scholars' reading would pre-
vent such inclusion as well.' 27 Requiring deliberative legisla-
tive bodies to make such distinctions before they are allowed
to benefit minority groups in their jurisdictions places signifi-
cant barriers to their action.
This increase of burdens placed on legislative bodies seeking
to use race or gender classifications to confer a benefit on a
minority group has the remarkably perverse effect of discour-
aging state governments from adopting programs to amelio-
rate the effects of race and gender discrimination. Now, if, for
example, a Hispanic business group seeks assistance from the
Legislature in the form of a purchasing set-aside to help busi-
nesses begin doing government business, three hurdles arise
to legislative action: (1) providing statistical evidence of dis-
crimination; (2) providing evidence as to why race-neutral pro-
grams will not suffice; and (3) narrowly tailoring a remedy.
Legislators will be in a position to blame the Court for their
inability to change the status quo. Since the fourteenth
amendment was enacted to secure full participation in a society
regardless of race, that result is particularly ironic. This dis-
couragement occurs not only because the dollar and time costs
of a Croson study are high, but because the ambiguity and inap-
propriateness of the tests raise the possibility that state ex-
penditures to develop evidence will be wasted because the
evidence developed may later be found to be insufficient.
Study and litigation costs are not insignificant for governments
battling with declining revenues and budget shortfalls.
IX. PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CROSON TEST
Professor Fried and the constitutional scholars disagree as to
whether Croson is a step toward a neutral reading of the equal
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protection clause.128 In other words, will all racial classifica-
tions, whether made for discriminatory or remedial reasons, be
subject to the same strict standard of review?' 29 The final an-
swer to that critical question awaits further Supreme Court rul-
ings. However, unless the Court backs away from Justice
O'Connor's formulation of the applicable evidentiary tests for
discrimination in future decisions, the Court has substantially
increased the burden on state and local governments seeking
to use racial classifications for remedial purposes.
The theoretical basis for this action is a belief that the four-
teenth amendment is a limitation on state power to use racial
categories for any purpose.' 30 This amendment, adopted to
end laws disabling blacks in society, is now being used to in-
crease burdens on efforts to ameliorate the residual effects of
racism.13  Assuming, arguendo, that the amendment is a limi-
tation on state power whenever racial categories are used, the
next question is by what standards should that limitation be
assessed. Are there some circumstances in which the state or
local government can be better trusted than in others, which
would allow greater judicial deference to state action? For ex-
ample, if a racial category is used to bestow a benefit on a
group which has minority status, can that state action be given
greater latitude than when a political system controlled by a
racial majority confers benefits on those belonging to the same
majority racial group? The Court appears to answer that ques-
tion in the negative. In other words, the rule is equally strin-
gent regardless of purpose or conditions. Thus, the Croson
Court seems to conclude that there are no circumstances when
the legislative branches of state and local government may
128. See generally Fried, Response, supra note 44; Comment, Scholars' Reply, supra note
45.
129. Fried, Response, supra note 44, at 156; Comment, Scholars' Reply, supra note 45,
at 163.
130. See J. R.AwLs, THE THEORY OF JU TICE (1971). Rawls wrote: "The principles
of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is ad-
vantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural
chance or the contingency of social circumstances." Id. at 12.
131. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 469. Justice Stevens stated:
A central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to further the national
goal of equal opportunity for all our citizens .... I therefore do not agree
with the premise that seems to underlie today's decision ... that a govern-
mental decision that rests on a racial classification is never permissible ex-
cept as a remedy for a past wrong.
Id. at 511 (citations omitted).
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be trusted to exercise wisely the use of race or gender
classifications. '
3 2
X. TOWARD A NEW STANDARD
The standard adopted by the Croson Court is, on its face, ap-
pealingly simple. In all cases and at all times when a state or
local government uses a racial category it must prove: (1) that
discrimination against the group occurred historically; (2) that
neutral alternatives have been considered and rejected as inad-
equate; and (3) that the remedy is narrowly tailored. While
theoretically consistent, this standard will adversely affect the
willingness of a dominant political majority to share the wealth
of the economic system with those who participate less fully.
This is precisely the result the fourteenth amendment sought
to prevent.
The philosopher, John Rawls, in his work, The Theory of Jus-
tice,' 31 writes of establishing the ground rules of a society and
its constitution from behind a veil of ignorance, where the par-
ticipants do not know their race, gender, life plan or
probability of success in the society.'3 4 Using this concept, a
reasonable constitutional rule would be one where benefits can
be conferred on nondominant groups in society so long as the
dominant group can use the political process to redress any
excesses. The political minority needs to be protected from
abuse, not excluded from sharing the fruits of societal success.
On a similar point, Bruce Ackerman, in his recent article in the
Yale Law Journal, wrote:
Decisions made by the government occur daily, also under
special constitutional conditions. Most important[ly], key
decisionmakers must be held accountable at the ballot box
for their performance; moreover, a structural effort is made
to encourage them to deliberate seriously about the public
interest and to constrain efforts by narrow but well-organ-
ized interests to use government to oppress especially vul-
132. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court expressed caution in
the exercise of judicial authority over matters resolved in the political process. To
emphasize its point, the Court quoted Justice Jackson: " 'The vice of judicial
supremacy.., has been its progressive closing of the avenues to peaceful and demo-
cratic conciliation of our social and economic conflicts.' " Id. at 491 (quoting R. JACK-
SON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 321 (1941)).
133. J. RAWLS, THE THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
134. Id. at 12.
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nerable or poorly organized groups."' 5
The debate over the standards by which state and local gov-
ernments can use affirmative action under the fourteenth
amendment needs to be over the allocation of responsibility
between the political and judicial arms of government. When
is it that the political and legislative branches of government
can be trusted and when is it that they should not be trusted?
The Court in Croson answers that question in a rigid and un-
yielding manner which has the effect of limiting efforts to re-
dress inequality in the name of equality. It is unclear whether
that is because it cannot see how to distinguish between ac-
tions which share society's success and those which deny op-
portunity, or whether the particular facts of Croson 136 caused
the Court to fear that a black political majority was granting
benefits to black businesses at the expense of a white political
minority. In either case, the Court has established the wrong
standard.
The fourteenth amendment limits the power of state and lo-
cal government to disadvantage racial minorities. Strict scru-
tiny, as defined by the Court, is appropriately applied when
nondominant groups are disadvantaged by a political majority.
The standard of review, however, should be different when a
political (race or gender) majority seeks to benefit nonmajority
members, using race or gender classifications, by allowing
them to share more fully in the economic or social life of the
community. The majority voters in that community should de-
cide if their political leaders have extended too many benefits
to the nondominant groups in society.
The initial question in applying strict scrutiny should be
whether the race/gender classification is being used to confer a
benefit on the group as opposed to a detriment. If the answer
reveals a detriment, the traditional strict scrutiny analysis
should follow. If, however, the answer is that a benefit is con-
ferred, the next question in the analysis should be whether the
benefit is being conferred by a dominant political group to a
group that is nondominant in the jurisdiction. If so, the strict
scrutiny should end there. It should end there because the
135. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 461
(1989).
136. In Croson, 50% of the city's population and a majority of the City Council
were black. City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989).
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political majority can use the electoral process to judge
whether its leaders have given more benefits than they should.
On the other hand, if the political majority seeks to reach be-
yond itself, to more fully include nondominant race and gen-
der groups into its social life, it should be permitted to do so
without having extraordinary burdens placed upon it.
The Constitution allocates power within our political system.
Clearly, there are occasions when race or gender categories are
misused to the detriment of those groups. Strict scrutiny is
necessary to assure that the power to make classifications is not
abused. However, that does not mean that one analysis fits all
situations. The ability of the political system to correct mis-
takes is substantially greater where a majority confers a benefit
on a minority, than when a minority suffers a detriment at the
hands of a political majority.
It is in our national interest to encourage the majority to in-
clude all members of society in the economic and social life of
the community, just as it is in the national interest to discour-
age the majority from using classifications to the detriment of
race or gender groups in the political minority. To achieve
those results, differing standards of assessing past actions are
necessary. The Supreme Court in Croson has failed to under-
stand those differing purposes and the need for standards of
review appropriate to achieving those objectives.
CONCLUSION
The Croson decision is seriously flawed in many respects.
Those jurisdictions willing and financially able to attempt com-
pliance will be faced with many practical difficulties in estab-
lishing factual evidence of the obvious-that racial minority
and female business owners face hardships in their economic
life that most white, male business owners do not face.
The standards for evaluating these programs set forth in the
Croson case are inappropriate, both technically and philosoph-
ically. If the responsible political majority in jurisdictions
working toward inclusiveness in an increasingly diverse coun-
try are to be permitted to continue, different standards for
evaluating these programs must be adopted.
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